Â Confusion in Popper*s Philosophy of Social Science
The writings of Sir Karl Popper on the social sciences are primarily a discussion of methodology. This is not surprising, for in speaking of the task facing these sciences he has said, "the best I can do as philosopher is to approach the problems armed with the weapons of a critic of methods1 *.3 -But it has been noted, e.g. by Prof. Noretta Koertge,2 that there is at least a prima facie incongruity between different elements in Popper*s methodological position. He claims on the one hand that the natural and social sciences share a unity of method,, while he argues on the other hand for social science method having features with no apparent parallel in natural science method. I argue in this paper, more than a mere incongruity, there is a full blown Inconsistency or confusion in claiming both that there is a methodological unity among the sciences and that the social sciences should adopt the principle of methodological individualism. Much of my argument is made in the context of an examination of Popper*s earliest work on social science. The Poverty of Hlstorlclsm. But the confusion is not I think bound to the peculiarities of this work, as my inclusion in the argument of many of his later works should show. Indeed, an examination of some of his more recent writings will indicate both why the inconsistency is inherent in his position and how his position ought to be altered to resolve it.
Before beginning, it is important to understanding both the point and direction of my argument to see the problem out of which it arose. Under such general rubrics as 'methodological individualism* and 'situational analysis', Popper has made a number of interesting remarks concerning the nature of human agents. I have been attracted to his position, not primarily from an interest in philosophy of science, but from an interest in action theory and the concept of a person. Popper coming from the direction of a different set of problems, offers solu tions similar to those attained in recent philosophical in vestigations into personhood and human action, and he shows how the results of these investigations can serve as a basis doctrine of methodological individualism or situational analysis, and his general methodological approach to which they are op posed is falsiflability, testability, or more specifically, anti-essentialism. Thus my case could be put schematically as follows: there is an inconsistency in holding both the methodological principles of individualism and of anti-essentialism. Popper argues that the social sciences should follow the lead of the natural sciences in avoiding methodological essentialism, i.e. they should apply the principle of falsiflability: this should be one of the minimum conditions placed on the claim of unity of method. But it can be argued that methodological individualism is a form of methodological essen tialism, so that there is a confusion in Popper's prescribing the former while proscribing the latter. Popper in fact grounds social science in the concept of a human agent, when all he should permit himself to have are theories concerning agents* The argument in the paper will be set out in the following order. First, I will give an account of methodological individ ualism or situational analysis as the doctrine is set out in The Poverty of Hlstorlolsm and elaborated in subsequent writings. Second, the weak case will be presented, wherein I will argue, negatively, that The Poverty of Hlstorlolsm fails to provide as argument sufficient for establishing individualism as a methodological principle. Third, it will be suggested in response that my negative case has been somewhat insensitive to the main line of argument in Popper's work: there are in fact good reasons brought forth by him for regarding individ ualism as a methodological principle, though these reasons may be more loosely connected with his general theory of method than the ones I argued were lacking. Finally I will argue the strong case that, despite the apparent satisfactoriness of the Popperian response just offered, there are positive and con clusive reasons offered by Popper's methodology Itself to reject individualism as a methodological principle.
The weak case and the strong case are interrelated. The weak case by itself would establish that there is an important lacuna in Popper's argument. Although the response I offer in Popper's name appears to substantially ameliorate the charge of lacuna, the strong case shows that the ostensible lacuna in fact masks a thoroughgoing confusion. The reason that Popper* s methodological arguments for individualism are less than satisfying, is that Popperian arguments in fact refute the claim that individualism is a methodological principle. Because my criticism is internal, I will be in the position of arguing against individualism in the name of the doctrine of unity of method, when in fact individualism is the aspect of Popper's thought I would endorse. I will suggest at the conclusion that Popper purge the inconsistency in his social science methodology by disavowing not individualism but antiessentialism, i.e. the view that natural science and social science share completely in a falsificationist method.
X. Methodological Individualism
What is Popper*s doctrine of methodological individualism? It is closely related to such notions as those of situational analysis, situational logic,rational (re)construction, and the rationality principle, so we shall be considering these all as parts of a single position.
Considering the position as set forth in The Poverty of Hlstorlolsm. the following is a characteristic expression of it. ^Methodological individualism [is the] doctrine that we must try to understand all collective phenomena as due to actions, inter-actions, aims, hopes, and thoughts of individual men, and as due to traditions created and preserved by individ ual men." 5 Thus, as the term 'individualism* suggests. Popper is siding with those who oppose any attempt to explain collec tive social phenomena Independently of the activity of individ uals. But what is significant in Popper's position is the insight that such opposition need not commit one to an abso lute social atomism. This insight is a development of his rejection of psychologism,® the doctrine that would regard all social phenomena as reducible either to human nature in general or to the particular propensities and experiences of all in dividuals involved. What for the individualist should replace psychologistic reductions of the latter sort, and how such replacement would avoid absolute atomism, are questions to a large extent addressed only implicitly in this early work. But the answers are present in nascent form in his discussion of the logic of the situation (p. 149) and rationality (pp. 140-1). We will examine these two elements as developed in Ms later writings to see how they provide an Individualistic alternative to psychologistic reduction. A clue to how this will be done is given in his suggestion that social phenomena should be given an institutional analysis rather than psycho logical analysis (p. 15*0 » In opposition to psychologistic reduction, Popper asserts "our actions are to a very large extent explicable in terms of the situation in which they occur." Any psychological aspect of the explanation "is very often trivial as compared with the detailed determination of [the] action by what we may call the logic of the situation."' In the analysis of an agent's action (relevant to some social science hypothesis), psychological elements should be replaced by situational ele ments in the following sort of manner. "The man with certain wishes . . . becomes a man whose situation may be characterized by the fact that he pursues certain objective alms; and a man with certain memories or associations becomes a man whose sit uation can be characterized by the fact that he is equipped f l objectively with certain theories or with certain information."0 What is the import of this shift from 'psychological' to •situa tional' idiom? For one thing, situational elements, as the quotation indicates, are objectively determinable, whereas psychological elements in general are not. The two principal types of situational element are, one, aims or goals, and two, theories or beliefs concerning the sltuationally appro priate means for achieving those goals. Both types of element are objectively determinable precisely because they are ex hibited in the agent's actions. Prof. Jarvie points out that desires or wishes only become aims when an agent acts socially to achieve them.9 But of course the range of actions in which the relevant aims and beliefs are exhibited must be wider than that of the action or actions for which an analysis or explan ation is being sought. For the aims and beliefs are objectively determinable when the hypotheses concerning them in our explan atory theory of the behaviour are critlcizable, i.e. when they can be tested in light of other of the agent's behaviour. Popper suggests the following example of this procedure.*-** A situational analysis of an action of Charlemagne's could be criticized by the discovery of a letter he wrote Indicating that his beliefs relevant to the situation in which he acted were different than those hypothesized in the analysis.
But an equally important aspect in this crucial shift of idiom is that situational factors would be seen as detèiattlnlag an agent's action in a radically different fashion than would psychological factors. Psychological factors are frequently regarded as causing a person's behaviour; they are typical candidates for the immediate efficient causes of human activity. An agent chooses his action in light of his situation, which means of course, in light of the situation as he per ceives it. i.e. in light of his beliefs and theories concerning his situation. But of course an agent's perception of his situation is never perfect, for it can fall short in two respects: in its verisimilitude and in its extension. Even if an agent's theories concerning his situation have a high degree of ver isimilitude, there is no way they can be even nearly compre hensive of the indefinitely large number of situational elements that could have a bearing, direct or indirect, on the results of what the agent does. At worst, the agent's theories may be radically false (the case of the madman). Since it is the elements of a situation which determine the consequences, near and remote, of an action, the fact that an agent's perception of his situation is imperfect entails that whenever he chooses to act there will be a distinction between those consequences of his action he did foresee and those he did not foresee. This is of course the distinction between intended consequences and unforeseen, so unintended, consequences. This distinction is central for Popper's theory, for "the main task of the theoretical social sciences . . . is to trace the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions."11 Only on a model in which action is seen as chosen, i.e. only on a situational analysis and not on a psychological analysis, can there be a distinction between the Intended and the unintended 11 Conjectures and Refutations, p. 3^2, originally italicized 490 E-9 effects an agent's action has in the world.
As a result of the emphasis on action as chosen, there is another important respect in which a situational analysis dif fers from a psychological, reductionistic analysis. This is seen in consideration of the following question. In a situa tional analysis, what kinds of factor are the subject of the agent's beliefs and theories? "In general, situational logic assumes a physical world in which we act. • • • Beyond this, situational logic must also assume a social world, populated by other people . • • and, furthermore, social institutions. These social Institutions determine the peculiarly social character of our social environment. These social institutions consist of all the social realities of the social world, real ities which to some extent correspond to the things of the physical world."12 In addition to the physical factors, there are the social, institutional factors that the agent perceives in his situation. In contraposition to the absolute atomism of a psychologistlc reduction, Popper grants a form of existence to Institutional social wholes. Institutions are elements of the situation, they have existence, because agents take them into account in their choice of action. Prof. Agassi makes this point under the label 'Popper's rational principle of institutional reform': "However bad the existing institutional coordinations are a prospective reformer will try his best to make use of them in his attempt to reform them or abolish them. Besides being subject to distributive reduction, there is another, related respect in which the social wholes Popper allows differ from those championed by holists. In his expli cation of Popper's position, Agassi emphasizes that the follow ing proposition must be rejected; "If 'wholes' exist then they have distinct aims and interests of their own."16 Social wholes exist but they can neither act nor have the qualities possessed by individuals in virtue of which individuals do act. "The theory . . . ascribes the power to act to all and only to those who have the power to decide, and • . . ascribes this power to all and only to individuals; not to collectives, and not to computers, etc.wl° This is so, I believe, because to attribute aims and actions to social wholes (i.e. to patterns of unintended consequences) would destroy the distinction of type between the qualities asorlbed to an agent In virtue of which he has effects In the world (e.g. alms), and the qualities possessed by those effects, even In aggregation. In light of ?n Popper's opposition to the holistic doctrine of a 'group mind', 0 I believe the position may be generalized in the following manner. Social wholes exist but can possess no (Strawsonian type) P-predlcates, All these points we have been considering are, I believe, implicit in the choice of an individualism based on a situational rather than a psychologistic analysis. The manner in which these points are interdependent demonstrates the appealing co herence of the doctrine. Situational analysis requires the existence of institutional wholes because these wholes are taken into account in the choice of action. But the model of action as chosen allows a distinction between intended and unintended consequences; and the latter in aggregation constitute a kind of social whole which is distributively reducible to individual chosen actions. Thus the position itself gives a non-holistic account of that apparently holistic element of which it re quires the introduction.
Let us turn our attention now to the second aspect of methodological individualism broached in The Poverty of Historlclam. How does the notion of rationality fit into the model as it has been developed so far? "In most social situations, if not in all, there is an element of rationality. Admittedly, human beings hardly ever aot quite rationally (l.e, as they would if they could make the optimal use of all available information for the attainment of whatever ends they may have), but they act, none the less, more or less rationally; and this makes it possible to construct comparatively simple models of their actions and inter-actions, and to use these models as approximations,"21 In what way is this sort of rationality part of the situational model of action? Popper later asserts: "The explanations of situational logic • • • are rational, theoretical reconstructions."22 Apparently, Just to give a situational analysis of an action is to show it as being (more or less) rational; i.e. rationality is implicit in the situa tional model, it is not superadded to it. In addition, to construct an explanation of an action by a situational analysis, all one need assume is that "the various persons or agents in volved act adequately, or appropriately; that is to say, in accordance with their situation. But if the application of the situational model is made co-extensive with the ascription of rationality, does not this amount to the claim that all human action is rational? There are at least two lines of response that could be taken in regard to this question. The first would be to postulate the principle in such a weak form that no one would deny that all action is rational in that sense. The second is to argue that commitment to the situational model should only require that the claim that all action is rational, even in the weak sense, be regarded as at best a close approximation to the truth. Popper apparently adopts the second approach, for, while being committed to the situational analysis, he claims that it is false to assert that the rationality principle always applies.24 The weakness of the principle for Popper is indicated by his calling it a "zero-principle" and by his asserting that it is almost empty of empirical content. But despite this degree of weak ness, he finds an indication that the principle is only an approximation to the truth in the existence of personal dif ferences "in assessing or understanding a situation", which "means that some people will act appropriately and others not." But any force the citing of such differences has in showing the principle as only approximating truth is, it seems to me, taken away when it is later claimed that the rationality prin ciple can be used in explaining the acts of a madman. With the acts of a madman, Popper suggests, one applies the ration ality principle by taking account of the agent's radically false perception of the situation. If the acts of a madman can be regarded as rational on the basis of misperception, then so it seems, most all acts whloh appear prima facie to be irrational.
But there is I think sin important truth in Popper's position that may tend to be obscured by the debate over whether or not all actions are rational. The difficulty with the notion of rationality is that it is tied, as Popper indi cates. 0 to the idea of the agent making optimal use of avail able information to achieve his goals. Optimality is a prob lematic notion: does an agent acting adequately to his situ ation always have to make optimal use of his information? Much more important to emphasize is the goal-directed nature of human action; this is I think the important truth in Popper's position. In the same passage where Popper links rationality to optimality, he suggests that although agents hardly ever act completely rationally, they do act "more or less rationallyM. Using this expression, I would like to suggest the following identification: to say that an agent chooses to act is to say that he acts more or less rationally, and this means that his actions are intended to achieve his goals in (not necessar ily optimal) light of the situation as he perceives it. Of course, an agent only takes action in light of his beliefs concerning his situation; we could neither perform, explain, nor under stand an intentional action which took no account of its situ ation. But the account taken of the situation need not be optimal for the action to be intentional. This is why I think the debate about rationality is to some extent obscurantist in this context. To avoid problems raised by the notion of optimal use of knowledge, I suggest the expression 'more or less rational' rather than 'rational' be used for the property which characterizes all human action; all intentional action is the former, but not necessarily the latter. The claim that agents act more or less rationally should be regarded as satis factory, unless one wished to give the principle an ultra-weak reading such that action is rational merely in virtue of being goal directed. We will find later some confirmation of this interpretation of what is most important in Popper's individ ualism, when we see how he counsels that the situational model of action not be abandoned even in those cases where there is reason to believe that rationality principle does not apply.
It is an important insight on Popper's part that human activity can only be intentional, chosen and (potentially, at least) rational under a doctrine which rejects the extremes Poverty of Hlstorlolsm. p. 1^0.
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of both holism and psychologistic reduction, at least, in sane of the forms that these doctrines frequently take. Psychologism can .be incompatible with action as intentional, chosen, and rational, because it dissolves the institutional wholes only in light of which it is possible to intend and choose; it contravenes •the rational principle of institutional reform*. Holism can destroy, the possibility of individual intentional action because it denies the agent the autonomy of his aims; his aims become merely the expression of the aims of the social whole. Even an optimistic holism which sees reason at work in the progress of history "denies to human reason the power of bringing about a more reasonable world."27 This fundamental insight of Popper*s could be expressed by reconstructing his position in the form of a transcendental argument* given that human action is chosen, intentional, and sometimes rational, it must be the case that only a situational analysis is appro priate to explain it; the latter is a necessary condition for the former. 
What is methodological essentialism, and why is Popper opposed to it?
It is the view that science should be concerned to discover the essences or ultimate natures involved in its subject matter. The methaphysical issue of the existence of such essences is not at stake. Whether essences exist or not, Pepper argues, science ought not to be conducted as if they did. This is because science is a falsif icationistic rather than a verificaticnistic enterprise: a theory can never be established beyond doubt, it can only either sustain or succunb to attenpts to falsify it. The search for essences is the search for ultimate natures or ultimate explanations, and these cannot be had since no theory concerning them could be verified. Better put-even if we had a theory which gave an ultimate explanation, we could never know this to be the case.
So the methodological essentialist, believing science should arrive at ultimate explanations, must be,broadly speaking, a verificaticnist, and such a position can only lead to obscurity and stultify scientific progress. This can be seen in the attitude the essentialist takes towards the definition of terms. Since essences are formulated in definitions, the e sse n tia l i s t will see the end of science as uncovering these definitions, and subsequently needing to progress no further. Rather, Pepper argues, we should adopt an anti-essentialist or nominalist attitude toward definition. Wards are mere instruments to be used in the advancement and testing of theories, and no definition should be regarded as more than provisional since no theory containing it can be verified. The scientific questions are not defini tional questions, 'what is x?', but instead questions of the sort, 'how does x work? '. For these reasons, methodological essentialism is ruled out by the condition of falsifiability or testability. Consequently, anti-essentialism is a valid methodological principle; and if individualism is iitplicit in anti-essentialism, this would be an indication that it is a valid methodological principle as well. Popper comes closest to asserting this kind of connection between individualism and anti-essentialism in the following passage. 498 
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And in the social sciences it is even more cbvious than in the natural sciences that we cannot see and observe our objects before we have thought about them. For most of the objects of social science, if not all of them, are abstract objects, they are theoretical constructions ... Very often we are unaware of the fact that we are operating with hypotheses or theories, and we therefore mistake our theoretical models for concrete things...The fact that models are often used in this way explains-and by doing so destroys-the doctrines of methodological essentialism... it destroys them because the task of social theory is to construct and to analyze our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalist terms, that is to say, in terms of individuals, of their attitudes, expectations, etc.-a postulate which may be called 'methodological individualism'. 30 Recalling Pepper's objections to essentialism, what is being claimed in the first part of this quotation is clear. The objects of a science are postulates of its theories, and we cannot take these objects as concrete, i.e. as entities with an essential nature, because the theories through which such natures would be postulated cannot be verified. This does not mean we cannot talk about these objects, or theorize in terms of them, but in our talk our terms for these objects must be treated nominalistically rather than essentialistically, i.e. their definitions must be taken in this way. One may ask, 'how does a state work?', but one should not attach much importance to the definitional question 'what is a state?'.
Popper's argument appears to be this. Because social scientists should be methodologically anti-essentialist, they should not treat such things as 'the state', 'the middle class', 'the proletariat', as concrete objects, and the way to avoid treating them as such is to analyze them in terms of individuals. Consequently, anti-essentialism implies individualism. But this is an illegitimate move.
Anti-essentialism or nominalism is, as we have seen, a doctrine relating to the way in which terms are handled in theorizing. 'For metho dological nominalists hold that the task of science is only to describe how things behave, and suggest that this is to be done by freely intro ducing new terms wherever necessary, or by re-defining old terms wherever convenient while cheerfully neglecting their original meaning. For they regard words merely as useful instruments of description ".31 Anti-eesentialism requires openness to change in the use of terras. So 'it certainly cannot be taken to mean, as! a methodological principle, that one specified term or set of terms should have precedence over others. 
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Presumably that is an issus determined by the theories we hold. Is a theory which analyzes states in terms of individuals better corroborated than one that does the opposite? This is not an issue to be decided a priori, i.e. as a methodological principle. Thus, contrary to Popper's claim, anti-essentialism should be seen to proscribe individualism.
But let us look more carefully at Popper's argument in the extended quotation above. Methodological nominalism is, more specifically, a doctrine on how definitions should be understood, and this is how it is sometimes developed by Pepper. He claims that an essentialist under stands a definition as reading from left to right, meaning that the con cept or term defined is the more important part of the definitiongiven the term, the task is to find the defining phrase. The nominalist, on the other hand, reads the definition from right to left,. the defining phrase is more important and the task is to find a terra to use as a short hand label for it. 32 Definitions are not then very important, because "shorthand symbols can always, of course, be replaced by the longer ex pressions, the defining formula, for which they stand". This suggests the following possible interpretation of the quotation. Because we observe individuals but do not observe states, 'state' in its various contexts should be seen definitionally as shorthand for a much longer expression referring to the activity of individuals. This is What is meant when it is said that our sociological models should be constructed and analyzed in terms of individuals, that what Popper calls a 'bare' or 'nominalist' description of these social wholes would be given in terms of the behaviour of individuals.
But if this is the correct interpretation of the passage, it in no way implies individualism understood as the autonomy position. For a bare or nominalist description would make no commitment as to the sort of behaviour in terms of which it is couched, i.e. whether the behaviour is chosen or non-chosen, intentional or ncn-intentional, rational or nenraticnal. This sort of definitional reduction in accord with nominalism would give only the utterly trivial truth that if there were no persons thepe would be no social wholes.
Let us turn to the second line of argument I am by reconstruction imputing to Popper. It is the claim that the methodological rejection of historicism entails the rejection of psychologism and holism as well, leaving by elimination individualism with a methodological justification. I believe this argument fails to get off the ground, for it depends on these three being the only alternatives, which they are not; e.g. Agassi points out that cybernetics is an additional alternative.33 But the argument is worth examining anyway. I will argue that while Pepper makes a success ful methodological case against historicism, and rightly concludes that 32 Open Society, II, pp.9-21, quotation from p. 14. 3 3 33 ; "Methodological Individualism", p. 187.
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F-5 psychologism entails historicism, it is not the case that holism need involve historicist method. Popper is concerned to keep sociology autonomous from both psychology and history: he is correct in seeing that he must reject psychologism to do the former, but he must only reject historicism, not necessarily holism, to do the latter.
What is Pepper's argument against historicism? Let me give a brief sketch. Its central point is this: historicism is a faulty doctrine because it sinply misunderstands the methods of natural science which it is attempting to emulate. In particular, it sees the purpose of social science as propounding unconditional predictions or prophecies, when in fact scientific prediction is necessarily conditional, i.e. dependent on the specification of initial conditions. Seme scientific predictions which seam to be unconditional, e.g. astronomical ones, only appear so because, in light of the constancy of oendions due to a repetitive system subject to minimal outside influences, reference to the initial conditions in the prediction need be only implicit. Historicist prophecy, because it is unconditional and so on a grand scale, will be historical in character; social science laws will be laws of historical development; and social science will became theoretical history. Historicism is led to these extravagances by failing to understand the methods of natural science it believes itself to be following. Historicism is to be rejected as a metho dology because it violates the condition of falsifiability or testability: successful testing depends on a hypothetical-deductive structure of ex planation with the specification of initial conditions, and explanation by unconditional prediction does not satisfy this form.
Pepper presents a strong case that the advocate of psychologism is necessarily led to adopt an historicist approach. Psychologism, in one version at least, is the view that all social phenomena are to be explained by the psychological properties of the individual participants (perhaps in interaction with their natural environment). The problem is that the institutional factor which loans large in the account given of any social phenomena can only be explained on this model ultimately by considering a time before there were institutions, when their founding would depend only on the psychological properties of the founders. But this move to consider beginnings must involve psychologism in seeking laws of historical develop ment, and so engaging in historical prophecy.
But the corresponding argument which attempts to link holism with historicism is much weaker. To begin with, it is not too clear what Popper understands by holism. He suggests it is the view that "the objects of sociology, social groups, must never be regarded as mere aggregates of persons". But he himself admits as a triviality that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts".34 Vfe may turn to Agassi's clear exposition Poverty of Historicism, pp. 17, 82. 34 501 F-6 of the position.35 Agassi, as we have seen, shows methodological individualism to be the position that social wholes exist but are not such as to have aims or take action; or more generally, social wholes can have no P-predicates. Although we get no argument for this very crucial point, the claim apparently is that for the ascription of any predicates other than a P-predicate to a social whole (distributive), reduction can be effected from the social phenomenon indicated to the intentional actions of individuals (and their unintended consequences). Conversely, such reduction is impossible if the social phenomenon is indicated by the ascription of a P-predicate to a social whole. One particular reason why an argument from Popper is urgently needed here results from his admission that situational logic is adapted from a principle of economic analysis.36 (Most of the examples of social science hypothesis he offers are economic in character.) While it may be fairly unproblematic to claim that the reduction to individual activity can be effected in the context of économie predicates ascribed to social wholes, what about contexts in which what is ascribed to a social whole is a non-P-predicate which is at the same time a non-eocncmic predicate? Popper's position requires reduction here, but we need an argument that it is possible. At any rate, we may take it that Popper understands holism as the doctrine that social wholes both exist and are such as to take P-predicates, e.g. that social wholes can be intelligibly spoken of as having interests or aims of their own. 
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F-7 holistic hypothesis would, while ascribing P-predicates to social wholes, consider whales that are on a scale small enough to permit conditional prediction and testing, thus avoiding the historicist trap. An example of a modest holist hypothesis would be the one offered by Professor Wisdom, that "Great Britain is a group suffering from sub-acute depression".^ Consequently, rejection of historicism does not entail rejection of holism, and there can be no argument to justify individualism as a methodological principle based on the claim that it is the only approach consistent with an antihistoricist position.
III. A Different Understanding of Popper's Argument
The purpose of the weak case has been to show that Popper has failed to demonstrate the connection between his doctrine of indivi dualism and the principle of falsifiability or testability. Since this principle is at the heart of the method which Popper argues is shared by the natural and social sciences, my conclusion was that he has failed to justify individualism as a methodological principle. But perhaps my rendering of the basic tack of his argument is based partly on a misunderstanding. Maybe there are other reasons he offers, less formal or rigorous than the implicative relation with the principle of falsifiability, for the adoption of individualism as a methodology in the social sciences. This is the possibility I would new like to explore.
Popper reports toward the beginning of The Poverty of Historicism, "I am convinced that ... historicist doctrines of method are at bottom responsible for the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences (other than economic theory)".39 Clearly Pepper saw the social sciences as being in general relatively stagnant and blamed this an their adoption of an historicist methodology. Jarvie suggests the strategy adopted by Popper at this point. "A poor methodology is one which does not help one to advance the study of problems", so "it is sometimes help ful to be articulate about method when one is blocked on a problem". 40 Under this interpretation The Poverty of Historicism is an attempt to present and argue for a method alternative to that offered by the histo ricist, in order to remove the block so that the social sciences may advance in the study of their problems. This is where the particular social science of economics canes into the picture.
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In the quotation above, Popper exempts economics from the class of those social sciences in unsatisfactory condition. Popper is clearly impressed with the success of economics. "The success of mathematical economics shows that one social science at least has gone through its Newtonian revolution". 41 in an article written a nutfoer of years after his early critique of historicism, Popper sees an alternative form of scientism infecting social science method, viz. naturalism, the view that theories are based on inductive generalization; but here as well he singles out economics as standing apart from the infection. 42 What is the methodological approach of economics, different from historicism and naturalism, which is responsible for its success? "The logical investigation of economics culminates in a result which can be applied to all social sciences. This result shows that there exists a purely objective method in the social sciences which may well be called.. .situational lo g ic " .43 Methodological individualism or situational analysis is simply the successful method of economics pres cribed for all the social sciences.
There is another reason for Popper's adoption of methodological individualism that can be distinguished. It is a consequence of what Jarvie calls Pepper's problem-oriented approach in his social science wri tings. 44 This is why, Jarvie suggests, we should not expect to find in
Popper a systematic exposition of doctrines. But the important point here is that the problems with which social science begins are for Popper frequently practical problems, for "problems of poverty, of illiteracy, of political suppression or of uncertainty concerning legal rights were important starting points for research in the social sciences".45 Reflec tion on practical problems often leads to the posing of theoretical problems, Popper suggests. Further, the concern with practical problems is for Popper directly relevant to methodological debates. "The more fruitful debates on method are always inspired by certain practical problems which face the research worker".46 The point is that practical social problems, especially of the kind with which Popper is concerned, to the extent that they are influential an the methodological debate, would clearly favour an individualist as opposed to a holist methodology. Popper's practical problem of reducing avoidable misery would lead toward individualism; the practical problems of a fascist, e.g. how to glorify the nation, would lead toward holism. This is the point where Popper's political liberalism and his ethical concerns and theories enter the picture. Popper's ethical theory that values and norms are chosen rather than discovered in the world, e.g., clearly requires his individualism; for as I have argued, only on a situational analysis is choice possible. 
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The fact that the practical problems which give rise to social science theorizing directly concern human welfare, may be sufficient justification for its methodology differing from that of natural science. Koertge, in her discussion of the differences between Popper's natural and social science methodologies, suggests: "The reasonableness of any method ology can only be assessed in terms of the aim towards which it is directed". The aim of Popper's social science methodology, she asserts, is "to facilitate the improvement of the human condition and not just to promote the rapid expansion of knowledge for its a m sake".4 7 TWo fundamental reasons have been suggested for Popper's prescription of methodological individualism. 1) The problem-oriented approach in his writings on social science which, because of his moral and political concern with the alleviating of human suffering, leads him to pose as the starting point for theorizing the sorts of practical problems which demand individualist answers. 2) His belief that the adoption of a holist approach has proved a dead end for the social sciences and that they should embrace the relatively successful individualistic method of economics. If these two reasons give roughly the correct interpretation of the basic direction of Popper's argument in The Poverty of Historicism, then my presentation of the weak case misconstrued his effort. Popper is not trying to show that a thorough-going adoption of the methodological principle of falsifiability makes individualism mandatory, only that there are at any rate seme good reasons for embracing an individualist approach. These reasons should fill the lacuna alleged by my weak case to exist in Popper's argument. Individualism would then be an adjunct, in the case of social science, to the main methodological principle shared by both natural and social science, i.e., falsifiability. The position thus afforded to individualism in social science method could perhaps be compared to the position Popper argues that metaphysical realism holds in relation to scientific method in general. "The task of science, which, I have suggested, is to find satisfactory explanations, can hardly be understood if we are not realists...And yet it seems to me that within methodology we do not have to presuppose metaphysical realism; nor can we, I think, derive much help from it, except of an intuitive kind".48 The finding of satisfactory explanations, which is intimately connected with applying the principle of falsifiability or testability, does not by itself require the doctrine of realism. But on certain occasions in the history of science, e.g., when subjective idealism or methodological conventionalism has acquired wide popularity, it might well be appropriate in light of the problem-situation thus presented, to explicitly prescribe realism as a methodological principle. But of course this interpretation requires that individualism be at least consistent with falsiflability. It seems clear that two methodological principles cannot at the same time be inconsistent and yet both valid.39 The central argument of this paper is that there is in fact an inconsistency here, and thus a confusion in Popper1 s thought. C a n a minimum condition for consistency between these two principles be set forth? That the following is such a minimum condition is I think fairly obvious, although an argument for its being such will not be given until the next section. For the two principles to be consistent, individualism must at least be metaphysical, i.e., empirically irre futable. This is just as it is in the parallel case I drew: realism and falsifiability are consistent because the former is a metaphysical doctrine, i.e., no empirical observation could refute it. Individualism, what I have called the autonomy position, must be a metaphysical view and not an empirical theory, if it is to be consistent with the principle of falsifiability. Before turning to the strong case, wherein I argue that on Popperian criteria individualism cannot be metaphysical, let us see if Popper himself regards it as metaphysical.
First it should be mentioned, to say individualism or any other doctrine is metaphysical is not to say it is uncriticizable.50 Empirical refutation is only one form that criticism may take. Any theory, meta physical, logical, or enpircal, can be criticized, by considering it in terms of the problem-situation out of which it arose: does it offer, considering all relevant factors, the best available solution to this problem or set of problems? So positing individualism as metaphysical and methodological would only make it a priori relatively to empirical evidence, it would not became an absolute presupposition. The doubts about whether individualism is for Popper metaphysical come primarily from his fascinating article Rationality and the Status of the Rationality Principle. There Pepper repeats the point that the rationality principle is not an empirical or psychological assertion, and states explicitly: "It does not play the role of an empirical explanatory theory, of a testable hypothesis";and "it is not treated in the social sciences as subject to any kind of test".54 But this point does not in Popper's view entail the conclusion I drew from it in the last paragraph. "In this way it may appear that.. .we treat the rationality principle as if it were a logical or metaphysical principle exempt from refutation: as unfalsifiable, or as a priori valid. But this appearance is misleading".55 The reason Popper gives for the rationality principle lacking metaphysical status is, surprisingly, that it is false, i.e., it is not universally true, consequently it is not empirically irrefutable. Apparently indivi dualism, in so far as its fate is bound up with that of the rationality principle, is not in fact untestable, but it is treated as if it were untestable. Hew can it be treated in this way, and what is the justification for doing so?
It is possible to treat the rationality principle as untestable because it is always a constituent part of the theory that is being tested, which is always a particular situational model. One could simply decide when a particular theory has been falsified to blame the other constituents of the theory, i.e., the hypothesized beliefs and aims. One is entitled to make such a decision, according to Professor Watkins, because "a policy of clinging to the rationality principle in the face of falsified predictionŝ 
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507 can be justified even from a falsificationist point of view". Without the rationality principle, he argues, the falsifiability of theories would be seriously undercut t so it"is treated as unfalsifiable in the interest of the falsifiability of the whole system".56 Popper offers a similar reason when he suggests the rationality principle be treated as unfalsifiable because rejecting it would "lead to ccnplete arbitrariness in our model-building". He offers a second reason which is, I believe, more basic in that it encompasses the first. In the case of a falsification, we learn more if we blame the situational model rather than blaming the rationality principle. The reason we learn more in blaming the model is because, though the rationality principle may be false, it is at least a "good approximation to truth". So even if it is false it will contribute little to the usually quite drastic breakdown or falsification of the model or theory.
The reason why the rationality principle is not unfalsifiable, hence metaphysical, is that it is false; the reason why it can be treated as if it were unfalsifiable is because it closely approximates the truth. With a clearer understanding of what it means for the rationality principle to closely approximate the truth, I think we may see that individualism itself is not falsified even in those situations in which the rationality principle strictly speaking is falsified. When Popper claims the rationality principle closely approximates the truth, he seems to mean that in the majo rity of situations persons act rationally, i.e., adequate to the situation, but occasionally they do not. The one exanple he cites where the principle fails to apply is consistent with this interpretation. It is a case of minor desperation, a frustrated driver trying to park his car when there are no spaces available.58 a s a rule a person acts rationally, but when in the grip of emotions such as desperation, fear, anger, or passion, he is liable not to act in this manner, i.e., he is liable not to make optimal use of the information contained in his beliefs about the situation. But note this obvious point: even these acts of emotion are acts, i.e., they are goal-directed and performed on the basis of at least seme of the situation-relevant infor mation the agent has available to him. The result would be the same if we took Popper's claim that the rationality principle approximates the truth to mean, not that only the majority of actions are rational, but that all actions are close to being rational, for this is simply the interpretation developed in the first section: all an action needs to be goal-directed is to be more or less rational.
When Pepper advises that we always reject the conjectured model rather than the rationality principle when our social science theories are falsified, he clearly means that that particular model is to be discarded, 
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feedback mechanisms, can at most be said to express or stimulate, but never to describe or argue, precisely because its activity is not intentional. Even if the machine activity is indistinguishable frcm that ©f a person, we could not, without being mistaken, attribute to it the ability to describe and argue, i.e., we could not attribute to it in ten tion al!ty. Popper's purpose in making these points is to present an argument for mind-body interactionism, in particular to shew there could be no "causal physicalistic theory of linguistic behaviour" of the higher functions. But in addition to making this case, these points also I believe indicate that the autonomy position, the view that hunans act intentionally, must count for Popper as metaphysical. Popper sometimes charges certain theoretical approaches with displaying a special type of inconsistency. Determinism is one of the approaches thus charged. Determinism becomes absurd when the theorist himself is seen in the light of the alleged universal and complete predic tability of events; for "physical determinism is a theory which, if it is true, is not arguable, since it must explain all our reactions, including what appear to us as beliefs based on arguments, as due to purely physical conditions".62 Qn another occasion, he gives a similar condemnation to a list of theories, all of which "try to rescue the causal completeness or self-sufficiency of the physical world". "All these are self-defeating in so far as their arguments establish-uninterfcionally, of course-the non existence of arguments".63 The absurdity or inconsistency involved with this sort of theory might be expressed by saying it violates the following principle: no theory can be self-consistent which has as an implication that argumentation (not merely overt argumentative behaviour) is not possible. 
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The reason is of course that there can be no such thing as a theory unless there can be argument, for a theory mast be falsifiable.
What differentiates true argumentation from what is merely overt argumentative behaviour such as could be engaged in by a machine, is as we have seen that the former presupposes an agent who engages in intentional, goal-directed activity. Moreover, the intentions in question must be those chosen by the agent himself as his own; for a machine, suggests Popper, though it cannot argue, could be said to have the intentions given to it by its maker or programmer (these would presumably be 1 quasi-intentions1 of the same sort that institutions can be said to have). This shows again the relevance of the notion of autonomy for Popper's individualist position. So the minimum condition for the existence of science or theoretical activity is that persons be intentional agents. This is not surprising in light of Pepper's claim that the scientific method of conjecture and refutation is embodied in the situational-analysis model and so is applicable to all hunan action, "since we can interpret an action as an attempt to solve a problem". 64 That scien tific activity can be captured in the same model used to explain action in general, is also indicated by a point of Jarvie's: "Rational thought can be viewed as merely a special case of rational action".65 So our principle may be generalized. No theory can be self-consistent which has as an impli cation that persons are not intentional agents; i.e., no theory may con travene individualism or the autonomy position. Of course, 'self-consistent' is being used here in a somewhat special sense. The series of propositions which formulate the determinist position, e.g., may be perfectly consistent among themselves, but taken together they are inconsistent with the fact that they constitute a theory. This second argument may be clearer if it is formulated along the lines of an argument explicitly advocated by Popper, second argument is, I believe, very analogous to Pepper's argument that rationalism cannot be oenprehensive, and it may in fact be a version of it. "Uncritical or comprehensive rationalism can be described as the attitude of the person who says 'I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience' ".66 But there is a logical difficulty with this form of rationalism, for the adoption of the rationalist attitude mast be prior to the acceptance or consideration of any argument what soever. Comprehensive rationalism is "inconsistent" and "logically untenable"! we most accept a critical rationalism which admits that the decision to adopt rationalism is itself irrational. It might be put this way: there is a logical difficulty in rationally questioning whether or not one ought to adept a rational attitude. I would put our argument in G-2 an analogous fashion: there is a logical difficulty in rationally questioning (through social science theorizing) whether or not persons are capable of rational action (and thought), and so capable of argu mentation. Popper's individualism is a pre-aondition for the possi bility of science as an activity/ so no theory can be allowed which by duplication denies it.
If our rationalism must be critical, our (social) science must be individualistic. Individualism cannot be empirically refuted, because refutation is a form of argument. For these reasons, individualism must be a principle both metaphysical and methodological.
IV. .The Strong Case
If Popper does have such forceful arguments at his disposal.-to justify individualism as both a metaphysical and methodological principle, why did I take such pains in rry weak case to argue that in fact he has given no such justification? The point there was to show that he has no argument for individualism based on his claim of unity of method: the claim that falsifiability or testability must be the rule in both the natural and the social sciences cannbt by itself require methodological individualism. In the last section the point was to search for reasons for adopting methodological individualism that are independent of what is required by the principle of falsifiability. It was suggested these could be found in Popper's problemtr-oriented approach (together with his moral and political concerns) and his conviction that the reigning holist methodology had proven quite fruitless. The rather speculative arguments presented subsequently would provide a more forceful reason for adopting individualism, but they likewise I think are independent of the principle of falsifiability.
Iteturning in this section to the relation between the principles of individualism and falsifiability, I want to make the case that as methodo logical postulates they are inconsistent or mutually exclusive. An argument to this effect is needed because it is perfectly in accord with the weak case that the rule of falsifiability!be neutral in regard to whether or not individualism can have methodological status. This is where considera tion of the question whether individualism has metaphysical status becomes important. It is clear I think that ary principle or hypothesis which is non-metaphysical and empirically refutable cannot intermingle at the methodological level with the principle of falsifiability: for the sake of consistency one or the other would have to be abandoned. This is because falsifiability applies to all empirical hypotheses, but raising a particular empirical hypothesis to methodological status is precisely the demand that it be treated as unfalsifiable ; therein lies the inconsis tency. Another way of making this point: ary empirical hypothesis has other empirical hypotheses inconsistent with it (otherwise it would be irrefutable), so making it methodological would a priori exclude these other hypotheses If there is such an hypothesis, there must be at least one crucial empirical test that could decide between the two. In that case the autonomy position would be potentially refutable or falsi fiable, and so would be itself an empirical hypothesis. We might refer to the hypothesis being sought as a 'puppet hypothesis' to point to the contrast with the notion of autonomy, since the hypothesis would be expressly designed to be inconsistent with the autonomy position. There are, I think, two main classes of puppet hypotheses, and each of these classes has innumerable members, any one of which would be an example sufficient to show Popper's individualism to be an empirical hypothesis. 1) There are hypotheses which postulate social wholes. Consistent with the requirements sketched earlier, these social wholes must take P-predicates in order that the hypothesis be inconsistent with indi vidualism, and they must be drawn on a small enough scale so as to avoid the falsifiability-based objections to historicism. That such hypotheses could be testable is, I believe, borne out by the prognosis given by Wisdom 70 Open Society, II, p. 20. for the state of depression he ascribes to Great Britain.
2)
There are hypotheses which reduce social phenomena below the level of the individual, so to speak, by connecting the phenomena directly with the natural world. An hypothesis could be imagined which, e.g., correlated types of social structure present in different socie ties with temporal variations in solar radiation due to sunspot activity, or with local variations in types of nutrients consumed. I have in mind hypotheses which would establish a direct connection between the natural and the social variables, not those which would establish the sort of indirect connection that could be easily sanctioned by Popper. Pepper would admit that the natural variable would influence the social variable either by being a factor taken into account by agents in their intentional actions and deliberations, or by being a factor which played a role in determining the nature of actions' unintended conse quences. But hypotheses of the sort under consideration would shortcircuit the alleged need for an indirect connection by denying the possi bility, central for Agassi's interpretation of Popper, of intentional or rational institutional reform: the phenomenon which is given that description would be explained in an entirely different manner. Such an hypothesis would in principle be testable given sufficient historical data. Popper could not object that such hypotheses would be illegitimate on the grounds that, in including the natural world in the way they do, they are outside the proper sphere of social science, for he does not recognize as binding conventional discipline boundaries: "We are not students of seme subject matter but students of problems ". 72
There is good reason then to think that at least seme hypotheses in these two classes are in principle empirically testable. But would they in fact be inconsistent with the autonomy position? It is, I think, clear that they would be from the following consideration. If any of these hypotheses were to be advanced in explanation of seme social pheno menon, no reference to the intentions or aims of individuals, actual or typical, need be made. ïhis applies both at the level of the explanation of the phenomenon and at the higher level of generality at which the hypo thesis in question is itself explained. In the case of hypotheses of the first class, if there is reference to aims, it is to the aims of social wholes. In examples of the second class, the universe is devoid of inten tions, no reference is made to aims at all. In the picture of the world drawn by these hypotheses, persons become merely the means through which intending social wholes or intentionless natural states have their effect in social phenomena. Individualism is primarily a mode of explanation of There is little doubt that Popper would regard these hypotheses as inconsistent with individualism. It is clear, e.g., that the second class of hypotheses betoken What he refers to as a physically complete or closed system in which mental states have no effect, in Which "the whole world with everything in it is a huge automaton, and .. .we are nothing but little cog-wheels, or at best sub-automata, within it".73 ^ case then is made. At least seme of the hypotheses in these two classes are inconsistent with individualism and in principle empirically testable, so individualism itself is an empirical hypothesis. As a result there is a confusion or inconsistency in Pepper's granting this empirical hypothesis methodological status alongside the principle of falsifiability, for the latter principle requires that no empirical hypothesis be exempt from empirical refutation. For the sake of consistency then either individualism or falsifiability must be eschewed as a methodological principle of the social sciences. It is a hard choice. We saw at the end of the last section strong reason to maintain individualism at all costs within our methodology. This is because scientific theorizing is an activity of man; so it must be understood anthropocentrically, in the sense of it being seen as a manifestation of individuals pursuing their autonomous ends. The end pursued in natural-science activity is the acquisition of kncwledge, the satisfaction of curiosity: this is why falsifiability is the primary methodological principle, for knowledge is acquired only through its application. But social science is a special case; for it is in seme sense a study of man, and the danger is that it can become a study of man in an impermissible sense, e.g., in the sense indicated by Pepper under the rubric 'historicism'. Popper suggests the metaphor: the historicist approach to social science "may be compared to a search light Which we direct upen ourselves. It makes it difficult if not impossible to see anything of our surroundings, and it paralyses our actions. To translate this metaphor, the historicist does not recognize that it is we who select and order the facts of history, but he believes that 'history itself' or the 'history of mankind', determines, by its inherent laws, ourselves, our problems, our future, and even our point of view".74 An historicist study of man assumes that man's ends or destiny is within its purview. 75 But such a study is logically illegitimate, for as we have seen in our consideration of the 'choice' model of action, action and aim generally arise together in a choice. 
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There is a necessary connection between them: an action must be intentional, and a wish only becomes an aim when it is acted on. A scientific determination of human destiny such as sought by the historicist, which would presumably comprehend a multitude of parti cular aims, would demonstrate the impossibility of scientific activity, or of ary human activity, by denying the connection between action and aim. The only permissible determination of ends is that undertaken through a situational analysis which, in being a 'choice' model, recog nizes the connections between particular actions and their aims; e.g., it is generally ex post facto and applies to single actions or a tightly circumscribed class of actions (using the device of a 'typical individual ' ). This is why the confusion is inherent in Pepper's position. Science is thought to be characterized by the unbridled pursuit of knowledge, which is why the principle of falsifiability is imported from natural science into social science under the banner of unity of method. The prescription that knowledge be pursued relentlessly raises no difficulty in natural science, but it does raise difficulties in social science, not just of the practical kind discussed earlier, but of a theoretical kind as well. In social science a distinction is required between proper and improper objects of study. The proper object of study is human action and ends as chosen, i.e., such as to require application of situational analysis. The improper object of study is human action and ends as nan-chosen, i.e., as a mere manifestation of natural forces (as in a physically closed system) or of social forces (as in a holism positing group interests and aims). The principle of falsifiability by itself is indiscriminate between these kinds of object, because both kinds are amenable to formu lation in empirical hypotheses.
Individualism is central to social science method. Must the principle of falsifiability -then be abandoned in order to resolve the inconsistency? It must I think, but only in an unqualified form. We should admit into social science method a principle of falsifiability, but only as qualified to allow individualism as an exception to its rule. Consequently, the claim of unity of method, being founded on the common application of the unquali fied falsifiability principle, must be rejected. The necessary qualification on the principle is shewn in the following formulation of individualism: although all particular situational analyses are falsifiable, situational analysis as a type of analysis is not regarded as falsifiable. On the unqualified principle the analysis type would be falsifiable, because the empirical character of the puppet hypotheses indicates the existence of possible explanations of social phenomena exhibiting alternative nodes of analysis. Jarvie,76 following Popper,would hold that the fact that 76 Concepts and Society, p. 5.
77 Poverty of Historicism, p. 131.
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517 situational analyses have a hypothetical-deductive structure and so are all falsifiable demonstrates unity of method. But this fact is not sufficient to show unity of method. For a thorough-going unity of method would not allow these alternative modes of analysis, along with the enpirical hypotheses which require them, to be a priori excluded from consideration. So the inconsistency in Popper's social science is resolved by retaining methodological individualism while denying unity of method. In social science method, the fais ifiability principle must be applied only in a qualified form.
Another way to express the peculiarity of social science method is to say that social science necessarily has an essentialistic base. Methodological essentialism is the position that we can arrive at final explanations, but this amounts to the view that an empirical hypothesis can be treated as unfalsifiable. This is precisely the way individualism is treated when it is made a methodological principle and permitted as exceptional under a qualified falsif iability principle. The automcny position constitutes an essentialistic definition for 'person' or 'individual ', because ary theory which would give these terms a different definition, such as a cybernetic theory defining a person as an automaton, is not allowed to contend. In this way, Popper can be said to have a concept of a person, when the requirement of unrestric ted falsifiability would be that he have only testable theories concerning'persons. Social science must have this essentialistic, conceptual foundation because science is a hunan activity. laws serve an explanatory role as well. Popper claims that "the world of each of our theories may be explained, in its turn, by farther worlds which are described by further theories-theories of a higher level of abstraction, of universality, and of testability".Î f falsifiability is not applied at all levels of explanation, the result is essentialism, the doctrine that there are ultimate explana tions. Scott is right to point out that testability does not apply at the explanatory level at which individualism operates, but far from showing the conpatibility of individualism and falsifiability, this demonstrates their inconsistency, if falsifiability is taken in an unqualified sense.
Thus the role played by individualism in the explanation of mass social phenomena is an indirect one. It serves to explain the lowerlevel hypotheses, and all such hypotheses must necessarily be explicable by it because it is a methodological principle. All lower-level hypotheses must be such that a typified situational analysis can be constructed to account for them, as the example above was designed bo account for Popper's inflation hypothesis. Or, as this point was expressed in section two, all hypotheses irust be such that distributive reduction can be effected to particular actions and their consequences. So individualism sets limits on the type of lowers level hypothesis which may be conjectured, and its importance for sociology and the explanation of mass social phenomena is in the extent of these limits. What is their extent. As indicated above, apparently any hypothesis is permissible which does not attribute aims and interests, or more generally P-predicates, to a social whole. But as I suggested, there is an argument badly needed at this point to show that all and only hypotheses attributing a non-P-predicate to a social whole can be accounted for by the construction of a typified situational analysis. 
